Facilities and training ground of Singapore Armed Forces at Brunei's Temburong District: Creation of a hybrid space to conquer the same defence objectives.

05 November 2020

Title
Facilities and training ground of Singapore Armed Forces at Brunei's Temburong District: Creation of a hybrid space to conquer the same defence objectives.

Landscape
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) facilities and training ground at Temburong District, Brunei.

Concepts / Keywords
Exclave, Hybrid Space, Negotiation of Space, Bilateral Relations, Defence.

1. Abstract
The title "Facilities and training ground of Singapore Armed Forces at Brunei's Temburong District: Creation of a hybrid space to conquer the same defence objectives" is a metaphor for the close bilateral relationship between Brunei and Singapore. In particular, Brunei and Singapore collaborates extensively on military defence. The Singapore Armed Force (SAF) will send soldiers for jungle training at Temburong, an exclave district of Brunei. This article will examine the creation and negotiation of a hybrid space where SAF uses as training ground, and the impact of SAF's activities on the physical landscape, economy and culture.

Besides references to academic and newspaper articles, part of the report is written based on my personal experience, observations and memories of my army training at Brunei.

2. Introduction
About Brunei
Officially known as Negara Brunei Darussalam (Negara Brunei Darussalam means "Nation of Brunei, the Abode of Peace" in Malay),[1] Brunei is a small semi-enclave country on the northwestern coast of Borneo. Besides the South China Sea coastline, Brunei is surrounded by the East Malaysian State of Sarawak.

Brunei is divided into 4 districts, namely Brunei-Muara, Belait, Tutong and Temburong.[1] Temburong District is an exclave that is separated from the rest of Brunei by Brunei Bay and Sarawak's Limbang District.

Similarities between Brunei and Singapore
Brunei and Singapore shared many similarities, including geographical size, location, history and culture.

Brunei and Singapore are small, but wealthy nation, with advance economies and very high human development index in Southeast Asia (SEA).[2] Both countries share border with Malaysia. Due to the geographical proximity, Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia shares similar climate and physical landscapes; particularly, the tropical rainforest.

Brunei has a land area of 5,765km²,[3] sharing border with East Malaysia and generated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capital of US$31,086.75 in 2019 (ranked 2nd in SEA).[4] Singapore has a land area of 725.7km²,[5] sharing maritime border with the Peninsular Malaysian State of Johor and generated GDP per capital of US$65,233.28 in 2019 (1st in SEA).[6] In comparison, Malaysia has a land area of 329,847km², generated a GDP per capital of US$11,414.84 in 2019 (3rd in SEA).[7]

Singapore was a former British crown colony,[8] while Brunei was a former British protectorate.[2] Unlike Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak, Brunei rejected the invitation to join the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 and chose to remain as a British protectorate.[2] Brunei gained independence from the British on 1 January 1984 to become an independent Malay Islamic monarchy again.[1]

Singapore's population is composed of 74.3% Chinese, 13.5% Malay, 9.0% Indians and 3.2% Others.[9] Brunei's population comprises 65.8% Malay, 10.2% Chinese and 23.9% Indian or Indigenous.[1] To a certain extent, there is similarity and familiarity in racial and cultural diversity across Singapore and Brunei.

Singapore is strategically located at the geographic centre of SEA and the maritime trade route between China and India. Brunei is rich in natural resources. Extensive crude oil and natural gas fields were discovered in 1929.[1] Revenue generated from the oil and gas industry transformed Brunei into one of the richest countries in the world, allowing Bruneian to enjoy free healthcare, affordable housing and education benefits.[1]

3. Brunei and Singapore's relations with Malaysia
Despite being immediate neighbours, sharing numerous similarities and economic ties with Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore perceived Malaysia as a constant threat to their existence. While maintaining diplomatic relationship, Brunei and Singapore have several bilateral disputes with Malaysia respectively.

History of Brunei
The Sultanate of Brunei was founded by Sultan Muhammad Shah on the Brunei River in 1363.[1, 10] The Sultanate grew into a powerful maritime empire, controlling much of Borneo and southern Philippines at its peak from the 14th to 16th Century.[2] However, frequent internal power struggles and British's colonial expansion on Borneo in the 19th Century resulted in the decline of the Brunei Empire.[2]

Brunei's Limbang dispute with Malaysia
In 1841, James Brooke helped the Sultan of Brunei to suppress a rebellion and was awarded land around the Sarawak River to establish the independent State of Sarawak .[11] Over the years, Brooke forced the Sultan to cede more river basins to Sarawak in exchange for cession money, which the revenue was desperately needed by the Sultan to fund the failing sultanate.[12, 13] Eventually, Sarawak expanded vastly eastward, from the northwestern tip of Borneo to the immediate vicinity of the royal capital, Brunei Town (later renamed Bandar Seri Begawan). The cession of Trusan river basin in 1885 leads to the Sultanate of Brunei being encircled by Sarawak.[13]

Limbang is strategically located at the central of the Sultanate, immediately south of Brunei Town. Limbang was regarded as the 'rice bowl' of Brunei (Cleary & Shaw, 1992),[12] as the fertile Limbang river basin grew most of the food supply of Brunei Town,[12] and is rich in minerals.[13] By 1884, high taxation leads to constant unrest and rebellions at Limbang, providing Sarawak the opportunity to acquire Limbang.[12, 13] In addition, North Borneo is also interested to acquire Limbang and other unceded rivers flowing into Brunei Bay to increase their revenue, strengthen their claim to Labuan and check the growing power of Sarawak.[13]

However, the Sultan realized that further cession of land would result in the disappearance of the sultanate (Crisswell, 1971).[13] Therefore, the Sultan firmly rejected Sarawak's offer of cession for Limbang.[12] The aggressive expansion of Sarawak and bitter fight for Limbang finally forced the Sultan of Brunei to appeal to Britain to stop further encroachment.[2, 12, 13] Eventually, Brunei signed a Treaty of Protection and became a British protectorate in 1888.[2] Thereafter, Brunei was administered by a British Resident and the Sultan was reduced to nominal authority.[2]

Despite protests by the Sultan, the British Foreign and Colonial Office approved Sarawak's annexation of Limbang in 1890.[13] The aggrieved Sultan do not acknowledge the annexation and consistently refused cession money offered by Sarawak.[12, 13] The loss of Limbang was a severe political and economic setback for Brunei (Cleary & Shaw, 1992).[12] Brunei was fragmented into 2 non-contiguous territories,12 where Temburong is disconnected from the rest of Brunei.

While the absorption of Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo as British protectorates stabilized the boundaries of the 3 territories, the disputed status of Limbang remained a sensitive topic of political contestation between Brunei and Malaysia today.[12] Brunei continues to regard the Limbang border as provisional, noting on official maps that Limbang is a district rightfully belonging to Brunei from the Islamic point of view, but is being administered by another government (Cleary & Shaw, 1992),[12] as Limbang was never properly ceded.[13]

Brunei's maritime claim in the South China Sea
Besides Limbang, the internal territorial waters boundary in Brunei Bay is not clearly delimited nor closed.[14] In addition, Malaysia proclaimed part of Brunei's resource-rich maritime territory in the South China Sea.[14]

The current maritime boundaries between Brunei and Malaysia were legally enacted by the British in 1958.[14] The maritime boundaries are straight seaward extension of the territorial boundaries between Brunei and Sarawak towards the limit of the continental shelf.[14] However, on 21 December 1979, Malaysia unilaterally published the "Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Boundaries of Malaysia" map (1979 Malaysia Map), which asserted overlapping claims on Brunei's continental shelf and Singapore's Pedra Branca, thereby triggering immediate diplomatic protests from Brunei and Singapore respectively.[14, 15] Furthermore, Louisa Reef , which is within Brunei's continental shelf, is disputed between Brunei and Malaysia.[14, 16] Sovereignty of Louisa Reef is controversial and dependent on the legal definition of maritime features, continental shelf, exclusive economic zone and fishery limits, which are subject to interpetations.[14]

Singapore's disputes with Malaysia
Singapore has several disputes with Malaysia that would resurface regularly. Bilateral tensions usually worsen whenever Malaysia is in the midst of a political crisis.[17] From Singapore's perspective, these disputes are nonsensical non-issues that were provocatively stirred by the Malaysian government for patriotic propaganda.

Notable bilateral tensions include the maritime boundary delimitation,[16, 17, 18] Water Agreements,[19] Pedra Branca,[16, 20] land reclamation at Tuas and Tekong, rail corridor, replacement of Causeway, air space control,[17] and port limit encroachment at Tuas.[17] While some of these issues were resolved, most disputes continued till today. Singapore leaders vowed to stand firmed to protect the country's sovereignty and territory.[17]

Security vulnerability of microstates
Brunei and Singapore are small, but wealthy countries surrounded by Malaysia. Furthermore, both are of strategic and economic importance to the region, making them even more attractive and vulnerable to predators. Iraq's annexation of Kuwait in 1991 is a recent example of a small wealthy microstate being annexed by its bigger neighbour.[21]

Nevertheless, small microstates usually maintain excellent record of persistence in the world stage (Kershaw, 2011).[21] In fact, there might be benefits for being small, because it is easier to defend and govern.

While Malaysia is currently 'friendly' to Brunei and Singapore, both countries do not take their security for granted, as complacency will lead to vulnerability. Furthermore, Brunei and Singapore still have ongoing disputes with Malaysia; not forgetting that threats could also come from other forces. Therefore, Brunei and Singapore cooperate intensively, establishing excellent diplomatic relations across many aspects.[22]

4. Brunei – Singapore Bilateral Relationship
Brunei and Singapore have excellent relations (MFA).[22] Both countries already established diplomatic relationship before it was formalized in 1984, following Brunei's independence.[23] Leaders from both countries maintain close personal ties, with regular exchange of visits at all levels.[22] Both countries collaborate extensively in defence, finance, trade, health, education, aquaculture and tourism.[22] Brunei and Singapore established long-standing arrangements;[22] notably the Currency Interchangeability Agreement (CIA) effective since 1967,[24] and close bilateral defence relationships established since 1976.[25]

Brunei – Singapore Currency Interchangeability Agreement
The Currency Interchangeability Agreement was established on 12 June 1967 to promote monetary cooperation between Brunei and Singapore.[24] Under the agreement, coins and notes issued by the Autoriti Monetari Brunei Darussalam and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) would be accepted in both Brunei and Singapore; and the currencies could be exchange at par, without charge (MAS & AMBD, 2017).[26] However, the Brunei Dollar and Singapore Dollar would not be legal tender when circulating in the other country (MAS & AMBD, 2017).[26] Instead, the currencies would be "customary tender" that would be repatriated to the issuing country periodically (MAS & AMBD, 2017).[26]

Historically, Brunei and Singapore already maintained currency interchangeability since the early 20th century.[26] The Straits Settlements minted the Straits Dollar as the uniform domestic currency in 1897.[26] The colonial and economic links between the Straits Settlements, Malaya, Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak resulted in the Straits Dollar being widely circulated as the de facto common currency across these British dependencies, as the Straits Dollar was exchangeable on par with their own currencies.[26] The Currency Ordinance of 1938 created the Malayan Dollar as the common currency for the Straits Settlements, Malaya and Brunei.[26] The Malayan Dollar was expanded to include North Borneo and Sarawak in 1950, before transiting to issue the Malaya Dollar and British Borneo Dollar in 1953.[26]

Malaya obtained independence in 1957. Malaya merged with North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore to form Malaysia in 1963. However, Singapore was kicked out of Malaysia and achieved independence in 1965. Subsequently, Malaysia proposed to issue its own currency from 1966.[26] Initially, Singapore preferred to share a common currency with Malaysia due to the extensive trade and complementary economic relationships, and to reduce frictions and transaction costs.[26] However, negotiations for a common currency collapsed, leading to Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore issuing their own currency on 12 June 1967.[26] Initially, Brunei and Singapore also signed CIA separately with Malaysia on 12 June 1967 too.[26] However, Malaysia decided to float the Malaysia Ringgit with the US Dollar, and terminated the agreements with Brunei and Singapore in 1973.26 Brunei and Singapore continued with the CIA.[26] Despite significant structural changes to the economies and domestic monetary policies, the CIA remained relevant for Brunei and Singapore, resisting several economic challenges over the years.[26]

The CIA boosted investor confidence on the Brunei Dollar and Singapore Dollar.[26] The autonomous Board of Commissioners of Currency Singapore and MAS are responsible for currency issuance and central bank functions respectively, providing check and balance to ensure the central bank is unable to print additional money to finance government deficits.[26] While there are changes to the monetary institutions and currency issuance framework, the credibility and discipline were preserved.[26] The CIA is also supported by the economic fundamentals of Brunei and Singapore, which includes their strong foreign reserve balance, current account surpluses and flexible domestic economies.[26]

Furthermore, the CIA is compatible with the macroeconomic stability of Brunei and Singapore.[26] As both Brunei and Singapore are small but open economies, an exchange-rate-centric monetary policy framework aimed at achieving low and stable inflation is efficient to directly offset imported inflation and indirectly reduce demand for exports (MAS & AMBD, 2017).[26] The CIA allows Brunei and Singapore to share the benefits of a credible nominal anchor by pegging their currencies.[26] In addition, the CIA eliminates foreign rate risks and transaction costs, which are essential to maintain the close economic and financial relationship between Brunei and Singapore.[26] The CIA has mutually benefits Brunei and Singapore for more than 50 years, encouraging stronger trade, investment, tourism and enhancing the strong bilateral relationship.[26]

Brunei – Singapore Bilateral Defence Relations
Brunei and Singapore officially established close bilateral defence relationships established since 1976.[25] The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and the Royal Brunei Land Forces (RBLF) cooperate extensively and the interactions continue to grow in scope and complexity.[25] SAF and RBLF interacts regularly through a wide range of activities, including bilateral exercises, visits, professional exchanges, cross-attendance of courses and knowledge sharing dialogues.[25, 27] In addition, Brunei also allows SAF to train in Brunei.[29] The leaders of Brunei and Singapore regularly reaffirms the need to maintain and further strengthen the strong defence relations between both countries.[25, 27]

It is beneficial for Brunei and Singapore to establish a close military partnership. Singapore is grateful to Brunei for allowing SAF to train in their territory.[29] SAF needs extensive land to conduct military training, especially jungle training, which is difficult to be conducted in Singapore due to land scarcity and rapid urbanization. Furthermore, the physical landscape of Brunei is similar to the landscape of Singapore, making Brunei an ideal destination for jungle training. In return, SAF's Officer Cadet Schools (OCS) conducts urban operations training for the officer cadets of RBLF at Singapore.[29]

Singapore imposed mandatory conscription on Singaporean males to serve two years of full-time National Service (NSF),[32] followed by 10 cycles of Operationally Ready National Service (ORNS).[33] The ORNS system ensures Singapore that there will be more than enough servicemen to be mobilized in the event of national emergency. While Brunei could afford to purchase the most advance military equipment, Brunei does not have enough soldiers to defend or operate the military assets, which serves as an absurd reminder of its vulnerability (Kershaw, 2011).[21] Therefore, from Brunei's perspective, the presence of SAF would act as a form of psychological deterrence to predators aiming for Brunei's territory and resources.[21] Besides the CIA, Brunei needs Singapore to defend the country's currency, assets and economy.[21]

In addition, the close defence relationship between Brunei and Singapore is part of a broader defence strategy. Singapore also has excellent bilateral defence relationship with Thailand,[34] which is strategically located north of Peninsula Malaysia. Although Brunei and Singapore were threatened by Indonesia's Konfrontasi in the 1960s, both countries currently enjoys warm and friendly ties with Indonesia,[35] as Indonesia progressed to pursue policies of internal stabilization and co-existence with neighbours (Kershaw, 2011).[21] Singapore's strategic defence relations with Thailand and Brunei ensures that there is holistic military strategies, check and balance of power on Malaysia and the shipping lanes along the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea from all directions.

5. An Exclave within an Exclave
Concept of Exclave
An exclave is a portion of a territory that is geographically separated from the main territory by foreign territory or international water. An enclave is a territory that is geographically surrounded by foreign territory.

Exclave exhibit several disadvantages and inconvenience, including transportation and governance. Strategically, it is difficult to defend an exclave as it is geographically separated and isolated from the main territory.

Temburong: a semi-enclave exclave of a semi-enclave country
Brunei is a small semi-enclave country that is almost completely surrounded by Sarawak. The South China Sea coastline provides Brunei with maritime access to the high sea.

The easternmost Temburong District is an exclave that is separated from the rest of Brunei by Brunei Bay after the annexation of Limbang District by Sarawak. Effectively, Temburong District is a semi-enclave exclave district of a semi-enclave country.

Poor accessibility and connectivity leads to negligence and poor economic development at Temburong District.[36, 37] Before the opening of the Temburong Bridge on 17 March 2020,[38] it is difficult to travel between Bangar (district capital of Temburong) and Bandar Seri Begawan by land, as a driver would need to drive for 2h via Limbang, passing through immigration checkpoints that are usually congested.[36]

As Brunei Bay is internal territorial water, the fastest and easiest way to travel between Bandar Seri Begawan and Temburong is via water-taxi, which requires about 45min.[36] A driver may also drive a car onto a fastcraft, which requires 2h to meander Sungei Temburong and cross Brunei Bay from Bangar to Bandar Seri Begawan.

Furthermore, sparse development and the thick jungle of Temburong makes the district a good hiding place for rebels and overland infiltrators, as experienced during the Indonesia's Konfrontasi.[21]

Lakiun Camp: an exclave within an exclave
SAF has two military facilities at Brunei. The headquarter is Jalan Aman Camp (JAC), which is located at Muara, the port town beside the capital. Another facility is Lakiun Camp, which is the base to support the jungle trainings within Temburong. As an overseas army camp, Lakiun Camp function like an exclave of SAF. Interestingly, Lakiun Camp is located at Temburong District, which itself is an exclave of Brunei.

It is a win-win solution for Brunei to allocate land at Temburong for SAF to setup an army camp and conduct military exercises in the jungle. This is because Singapore needs extensive land to conduct jungle training. Singapore do not have enough rainforest to conduct jungle training due to land scarcity and rapid urbanization. Furthermore, the physical landscape of Brunei, in terms of vegetation and terrain, is similar, but tougher than the landscape of SAF's training areas in Singapore. Extensive, similar but tougher landscape makes Brunei an ideal destination for SAF's jungle training.

From Brunei's perspective, Temburong is an exclave that is sparsely populated and largely agricultural or covered with thick primary rainforest. The presence of SAF at Temburong would act as a form of psychological deterrence to threats and the presence of SAF stimulates the local economy. Furthermore, Lakiun Camp and SAF's jungle trainings have minimal impact on majority of Brunei population, who resides in West Brunei.

In addition, the landscape of Temburong is similar to the landscape of Limbang and rural Peninsular Malaysia. Therefore, familiarity with the landscape would be an advantage for SAF and RBLF in the event of conflict and there is a need for the armed forces to counter an offensive towards Limbang or other parts of Malaysia. After all, forces that are flexible and deployable enough to move rapidly between different environments and types of operations is an strategically important for defence and deterrence (Tan, 2011).[41]

6. Hybrid Space
Jungle Adventure at Temburong
The thick primary rainforest at the interior of Temburong is the main training ground of SAF in Brunei. I visited Brunei for jungle training during my National Service. The trip lasted for 18 days (from 21 April 2006 to 8 May 2006) and comprise of a jungle orientation training, climbing Mount Biang and other minor jungle exercises [please see "Annex A" for details of my Brunei trip].[42]

SAF conducted assorted jungle trainings for officer cadets, Infantry, Commando and Ranger in the rainforest of Temburong. Collectively known as Exercise Lancer, notable jungle trainings include the Jungle Confidence Course (JCC), Support arms Officer Cadet Jungle Orientation Training (SOCJOT), Exercise Nomad and climbing Mount Biang. These exercises aim to train officer cadets for jungle navigation and survival.

Creation of a Hybrid Space at Temburong
Lakiun Camp is SAF's base to support the jungle trainings conducted at the rainforests within the vicinity. Lakiun Camp is located along Labu Highway, about 9km east of Bangar. It is strategically located at the mid-point of Labu Highway, the only East-West thoroughfare of Temburong, with trans-national access into Sarawak at both ends. It takes approximately 1h to travel from Bangar to Lakiun Camp by bus.

Lakiun Camp is located on the mid-slope of a mountain. The bunks resemble the long house of Borneo's indigenous people, but were constructed using zinc and wood. The bunks also looks like those disused camps at Pulau Tekong. Each long house can house 70 boys, while the furniture are legacy of SAF's hardware from previous generations. Although cantilevered on silt, with a veranda around its perimeter, the bunk has poor air ventilation, making it very hot and stuffy. This is weird, because architecturally, the bunk should be cool. The heat and poor ventilation might probably be due to the zinc wall, small window design and east-west orientation. The floor is constructed using wooden planks, which will vibrate whenever someone walks past.

As Lakiun Camp is a military base owned and operated by SAF, it creates a hybrid space that feels neither like Singapore or Brunei. Legally, SAF soldiers enjoys extraterritorial rights within Lakiun Camp. However, troops training in Brunei are expected to follow the rules of SAF and laws of Brunei. Interestingly, besides Lakiun Camp, SAF do not own the training grounds at Temburong. Therefore, the jungle trainings are conducted in a negotiated space.

Negotiation of Space & Impact of SAF's presence at Temburong
SAF's training were mainly conducted in the rainforests, which will not interfere with the everyday life of most locals. As SAF's soldiers are either confined within Lakiun Camp or in the jungle, there is minimal interactions with the locals, except during the Educational Tour at Bandar Seri Begawan.

As SAF do not own the training grounds at Temburong, SAF imposed strict rules for the jungle trainings conducted in the negotiated space, so as not to damage the environment or cause inconvenience to the locals. SAF's instructors will give detailed briefings and instructions to the soldiers on not to damage the environment and not to disturb or cause inconvenience to the locals. These are basic courtesy required from SAF to the host country.

For example, the primary forests are important natural and environmental assets, the army boys are instructed not to litter within the jungle. Strict measures, including item checks before and after an exercise were imposed to ensure that all garbage are accounted for and not abandoned in the forest. As the indigenous Iban population still live in the rainforest, occasionally, there were reports of SAF training troops who encountered the Iban. The soldiers are instructed to respect and not interfere with the everyday life of the Iban.

Soldiers are not allowed to take shortcuts across padi fields or plantations, to avoid killing or damaging the crops. There are accounts that farmers demanded compensation from SAF for alleged damages done by SAF troops, evitable from the unique footprints left behind by the SAF boots. While such claims are subject to further investigation, SAF would usually compensate the damages, because such incidents are rare and SAF do not want such unhappiness to affect the opportunity to train at Temburong and bilateral relationships.

In addition, as Brunei is an Islamic country, soldiers are not allowed to possess or consume pork or alcohol within Brunei. However, cigarette is easily available and unbelievably cheap in Brunei.

As the Singapore Dollar is accepted as "customary tender" at Lakiun Camp Canteen and shops in Bandar Seri Begawan, army boys do not need to exchange money for the trip. Unlike in Singapore, where many businesses and individuals prefer not to accept the Brunei Dollar, businesses in Brunei accepts the Singapore Dollar happily and we are able to pay using Singapore Dollars without rejection. Such acceptance level indicates that the Singapore Dollar is widely circulated in Brunei, and Singapore army boys probably plays a significant role in boosting the local economy. Furthermore, we noticed that many snacks, canned food and fashion are actually imported from Singapore. Therefore, these products are priced slightly higher (about 10% more) than in Singapore. In addition, food in Brunei are similar to Malay and Indian Muslim cuisines in Singapore.

Identity of a Hybrid Space (from a Singaporean's perspective)
From my experience, the physical landscape of Temburong Jungle indeed resembles SAF's training areas in Singapore. Without caption, a photo of Temburong could be mistaken as Western Water Catchment, Ama Keng, Mandai or Tekong. Perhaps, the differences are tougher terrain, higher knolls, steeper slopes, taller and denser trees.

To make feelings more complicated, Brunei shares the same time zone (GMT+8) with Singapore. However, as Singapore is in the wrong time zone , I feel that there is technically a 1h time difference.

The presence of SAF, similarity in physical landscape, acceptance of home currency at foreign land, and availability of familiar products blurs the border. Together with racial, religious and cultural diversity and familiarity, these generates an impression that as if I am still in Singapore, even though I am physically in Brunei. These hybridity constructed the impression of a hybrid space,39 making Brunei appears like an exclave of Singapore.

7. Challenges & Solutions
The excellent bilateral relations between Brunei and Singapore will continue for as long as Brunei and Singapore are small, wealthy, vulnerable, and still consider Malaysia or other forces as an exogenous threat. However, a few endogenous challenges might disrupt existing bilateral defence relationships and CIA.

Temburong Bridge
Temburong Bridge was opened to traffic on 17 March 2020.[38] The 30km highway between Bangar and Bandar Seri Begawan reduced driving time from 2h to 30min.[36] The project was built to provide Temburong with direct land connection to the airport and port, with an aim to stimulate economic growth at Temburong.[37]

Temburong is no longer an isolated exclave after the completion of Temburong Bridge. With improved connectivity and potential economic development, it might affect Brunei's decision to allocate space for SAF's military training.

Singaporeans' Perception of Brunei
Like many Singaporeans, my perception of Brunei's landscape is army, rural, forested, exotic, mysterious and tough before my Brunei trip. While some urban legends like Brunei gets dark at 5pm, unable to see our fingers at night, tough terrain, killing of quail, proves to be true, many myths were debunked after my Brunei trip.

For example, I was very surprised that streams in the jungle are extremely fresh and clear, as opposed to the rumoured muddy "milo water", and small fish and prawns can be seen swimming in the streams. The morning of Temburong is cool, where the ruralscape is covered with a blanket of morning mist, making the landscape appears mystical. The views of Temburong rainforests from a Super Puma helicopter are fascinating. The beautiful scenery is filled with lush greenery, contrasting with small houses that look like lego bricks. There is more potential for Temburong's rainforest than just military jungle training.

Potential for Themed Tourism
Brunei is only a 2h flight from Singapore, but Singaporeans seldom travel to Brunei for tourism. Most guys do not re-visit Brunei after their army experience. This is a huge contrast with Thailand and Taiwan, where SAF also has overseas training, but are popular travel destination among Singaporeans. It is even weirder if we consider that Bandar Seri Begawan shares the same flight radius as Bangkok and there is no need to exchange currency. While Brunei might not appeal to everyone, it could be an attractive destination for specific tourists – the adventurers, green travellers, military geeks and humanities scholars. Brunei may consider exploring themed tourism to target these groups.

As SAF only used the vicinity of Lakiun Camp for jungle training, there is still huge tract of primary rainforest in Temburong with opportunities for adventurous and eco-friendly tourism. Perhaps, Brunei could collaborate with Outward Bound Singapore (OBS) to setup an overseas campus at Temburong. The proposed OBS @ Temburong could target students of Pre-University level, especially those from Outdoor Adventure Club (ODAC) and uniform groups. Besides learning about jungle navigation and survival skills, OBS @ Temburong could educate the participants on leadership, geography and environmental protection.[40] Humans are paranoid of the unknown. Many boys are worried about NSF life and it is not helping that the urban legends of Brunei adds to the anxiety. Experiencing a short jungle boot camp at Temburong during Pre-University will help to reduce the anxiety and be better prepared for NSF and Exercise Lancer.

Advanced outdoor programmes could also target Singaporeans who are more adventurous, enjoys outdoor challenges or would like to reminisce memories of army days. After all, it is a fun experience sleeping in a hammock and being close to nature. However, opening up the rainforests for activities will expose the jungles to damages and pollution. Perhaps strict rules similar to SAF's should be enforced on the tourists to ensure that tourism activities will not disturb the environment and everyday life of indigenous locals.

For the less adventurous tourists, they may check into an eco-friendly resort to relax and enjoy a panoramic view of Temburong from a helicopter. Furthermore, Bandar Seri Begawan has potential to develop historical and cultural tourism. The Brunei Museum documented the history, territorial evolution and insights on the oil economy. Kampong Ayer is a floating water village built on stilt in the middle of Brunei River that could be utilized for authentic homestay.

Improved connectivity and development of themed tourisms will stimulate the economic growth of Temburong and check on illegal logging. Increased interactions will improve the impression of Brunei and further enhancing the depth of bilateral relations between Brunei and Singapore.

8. Conclusion
Brunei and Singapore established excellent bilateral relations long before it was formalized. Both countries collaborate extensively in defence, finance, trade, health, education, aquaculture and tourism; notably the Currency Interchangeability Agreement and close bilateral defence relationships.

Brunei and Singapore are small but wealthy microstates that are surrounded by a bigger neighbour that might be aiming for their territory and resources. SAF needs extensive land to conduct military training and Brunei needs Singapore to defend the country's currency, assets and economy. Besides its primary role in military defence, SAF is also punching above its weight by contributing to bilateral relations through alliance building (Tan, 2011).[41]

The annexation of Limbang teach Brunei a painful lesson that Brunei needs to defend its territory against encroachment from exogenous forces. As Temburong is an isolated exclave that is difficult to defend, the presence of SAF would act as a form of psychological deterrence to predators. Furthermore, the landscape of Temburong is similar to Malaysia, which would be an advantage for SAF and RBLF to counter an offensive during conflict.

Excellent diplomatic relations, complex bilateral cooperation, the presence of SAF, similarity in physical landscape and acceptance of home currency overseas blurs the border between Brunei and Singapore. These hybridity creates a hybrid space that feels neither Brunei nor Singapore. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for Brunei and Singapore to maintain and further strengthen the strong bilateral relations, as both countries mutually benefits from the close ties. In fact, Brunei and Singapore should explore more diverse partnerships beyond existing cooperation.

References
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Annex A: Boon Ping's Memories of Brunei

[This is my Final Paper submitted for "GE5214 Landscapes of Southeast Asia" module on 5 November 2020 for AY2020/2021 Semester 1. "GE5214 Landscapes of Southeast Asia" is offered by National University of Singapore (NUS) Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences (FASS) Department of Geography & Department of Southeast Asian Studies, and is taught by Dr Hamzah bin Muzaini.]

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